tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post8380909965031361422..comments2021-01-07T07:56:36.212-08:00Comments on CatComConM2016: 8b. Blondin Massé et al (2012) Symbol Grounding and the Origin of Language: From Show to TellUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger55125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-5496789917067179172016-04-09T15:25:25.021-07:002016-04-09T15:25:25.021-07:00"We are not sure whether chimps really do get..."We are not sure whether chimps really do get it. They get the associations and the contingencies; but do they get them as propositions, with truth values? It’s It is hard to say. What’s most puzzling is why they don’t seem to pick up on the power that is within their hands when they start systematically combining symbols to define new categories. What seems missing is not the intelligence but the motivation, indeed the compulsion, to name and describe"<br /><br />I never really thought about it like this before. Chimps/other primates are known to be extremely intelligent, and extremely similar to humans, but perhaps that which differentiates their intelligence from ours is the motivation. This leads me to wonder if there is any less feeling there? Motivation does stem from some sort of feeling... so perhaps that which differentiates the extremely intelligent apes from humans is the same thing that differentiates us from robots that (we assume) don't feel. I know that apes are known to have feelings like jealousy, empathy, etc, but their lack of motivation to explore and use their knowledge to breed further results really does make me think about whether or not robots would have any sort of motivation to innovate as well. Hillary Mullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06848147615231752956noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-79229486358152837722016-04-08T16:56:58.712-07:002016-04-08T16:56:58.712-07:001. “Notice that in a formal symbol system we have ...1. “Notice that in a formal symbol system we have true “autonomy of syntax,” in the sense that the rules governing the symbol manipulations are completely independent and formal: they have no recourse to meaning.”<br />I’ll try to make sense of “autonomy of syntax” in the context of language, to make sure that I get it right. So in the case of “linguistic” syntax, the rules would be word order (where the verb, the subject and the object go in the sentence) and things of the sort? These would be autonomous from meaning because the word order determines the shape of the sentence (in English: Subject, then verb, then object) without any meaning having to be assigned to each word. <br /><br />2. “To construe A is B as a proposition—as asserting something true about the world, rather than just producing a string of associations for instrumental purposes—may have required a new cognitive capacity, perhaps even one with a genetic basis.”<br />So, at the stage of pure showing, before the new “cognitive capacity” was developed things like A is B would not have existed? At that stage, any “showing” would simply be creating an association between things in the world and the showing, not between elements in the showing? So if, for example, I am miming a cat, the mime is not propositional because it’s only establishing an association between the real world thing that is a cat and my actions and not really creating a proposition linking the cat to something else (another category)?<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06246140211575192710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-78308937480137132982016-04-08T16:56:45.575-07:002016-04-08T16:56:45.575-07:00Hey Alba!
"I'm a bit confused how chimps...Hey Alba!<br /><br />"I'm a bit confused how chimps having categories "Chimps have categories. We keep training them to “name” their categories (whether with gestures, symbolic objects, computer keyboards, or words) — even to combine those names into quasi-propositional strings. " but this contradicts what was said that pantomime alone cannot convey new categories. Wouldn't chimps need pantomime "gestures" to convey the categories they have?"<br /><br />I think I can clarify a little bit. Chimps, just like us, have categories, and are capable of category learning. They are able to learn how to do the right thing with the right kind of thing and label these kinds using arbitrary symbols (gestures, objects, keyboards, words...). This is unsurprising as categories are useful for knowing what to do and what not to do in the world. Chimps learn these categories via firsthand experience, or via induction (observation of descriptive pantomime in other members of the species who already possess the given category). As a result, chimps are able to use categories in a purely descriptive manner.<br /><br />What chimps do not possess is a capacity for proposition, or veridical statements about category combinations and the relationships between categories. This is a quality of language which allows for category learning in humans via a third additional method: instruction (learning propositions about composite categories from someone who has already experience them).<br /><br />Maybe that clears things up a little?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18089731907917510563noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-87099929904621407652016-04-08T16:55:46.641-07:002016-04-08T16:55:46.641-07:00"We suggest that this is how the proposition ..."We suggest that this is how the proposition was born. Learners may have begun picking up new composite categories through passive observational learning. But once the knower - motivated to help the kin or collaborators learn by sharing categories, it became intentional rather than incidental instruction, with the teacher actively miming the new category descriptions to the learner."<br /><br />This is a concept I find fascinating. I've been consistently troubled by this idea since it emerged - how and why did human make the transition from pantomime (simple category description) to proposition (making veridical statements about categories and how they are defined by other categories). This article gave me something fairly substantial to chew on as far as why, but I'm not as convinced by the how.<br /><br />As before, I'm still haunted by Noam Chomsky's acknowledgement that "[an innate language faculty] poses a problem for the biologist, since, if true, it is an example of true 'emergence' - the appearance of a qualitatively different phenomenon at a specific stage of complexity of organization."<br /><br />The passage from this week's article that I cited would claim that the transition from pantomime to proposition was the transition from incidental to intentional instruction. In my mind, I don't see how this solves the problem (which maybe the article wasn't even intending to do, but I'll make it my scapegoat anyways, so I can vent my troubles). Incidental to intentional seems as much a leap to me as description to proposition, almost by definition. Watching someone (your teacher) do the right thing with the right kind of thing is fine and dandy as a way of learning categories and the affordance of certain objects, but as soon as your teacher starts explaining things intentionally, and combining categories to designate new categories, we're in the realm of propositions. It would seem to me that this evolutionary explanation of how the proposition was born doesn't seem to close that wide gap between showing and telling.<br /><br />I still can't conceive of a way that a single favourable mutation could give us propositional language, or how propositional language could have arisen gradually as a result of an accumulation of favourable mutations (since we've agreed that protolanguages cannot exist).<br /><br />I feel that the Pinker article didn't even try to address this question, and while this paper was convincing, I was still left somewhat unsatisfied.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18089731907917510563noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-10703806650290482812016-04-08T14:25:03.706-07:002016-04-08T14:25:03.706-07:00After reading this article, I think my biggest que...After reading this article, I think my biggest questions lies with UG, the Kernel and MGS. In addressing the symbol grounding problem with language, the paper claims UG is "a complex set of rules that cannot be acquired explicitly from the child’s experience because the child does not produce or receive anywhere near enough information or corrective feedback to learn the rules of UG inductively, by trial and error. So UG must be inborn" and while my intuitive question is whether UG therefore IS language, I have given it a bit more thought and decided explore why exactly UG must be inborn? First of all, what exactly is UG and how can we be more specific with what it is other than "a complex set of rules" ? Perhaps this is better explained elsewhere, but the majority of UG definition is what it's not, so what exactly is it, or are we still somewhat unsure? <br /><br />In addition, the Kernel and MGS, while very interesting to learn about, seems to me more specific to 'natural language' as we know it in present day, and does not necessarily apply to the thousands and thousands of years in which language has evolved through founder effects, drifts, hybridization, and adaptation. For example, putting UG aside for now, the Kernel is said to be about 10% of the dictionary or ~500 words (in English dictionary, I'm assuming). What would the Kernel have looked like when we first started using what we call 'natural language'? Surely, it must have been so vastly differently in many facets, so while it maybe be unlikely that a child can learn 500 content words through induction (though not impossible), it may have been much easier for children 10,000 years ago to learn their version of the Kernel or MGS, rather. And thus, symbols could've been grounded only through induction and without the presence of so called UG. The article specifically claims that MGS is "the smallest number of words from which all the rest can be reached by definition alone" which is not unique. If our current MGS can vary, then why couldn't those of a natural language long ago have varied enough such that language could have be taught without an inborn UG, but rather just something that evolved for the capacity to learn any language (natural or otherwise) through natural selection. So many animals have variations of language, none of which would be considered 'natural language,' so what makes UG so special to humans? Annie Wenan Chenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15306593618230424849noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-11235959455852832412016-04-07T21:55:30.201-07:002016-04-07T21:55:30.201-07:00One part of this article states that the natural c...One part of this article states that the natural candidate for learning categories is direct sensorimotor experience, and then goes on to explain how explaining using language (ie through dictionaries or another human) develop as another method for learning categories (and facilitated the development of language in the process). This makes me wonder about any other potential candidates for category-learning. Many people mention to me (when they learn that I’m a cognitive science student) that they have a fantasy of hooking their brains up to an information super-cable and learning all that there is. I usually respond skeptically, citing lack of technology and the fact that we would not be acquiring this information by experience. Reading this, however, made me go back and question these assumptions. Perhaps there will be a way to simulate experience, but speeded up, so that categories can be acquired (and learning can occur). Or perhaps a fast-forwarded experience will not be necessary; we can simulate the necessary neural arrangements and create false memories and associations to them so as to facilitate recall. If these associations were not created would we still possess the categories? I think not. This is likely all fantasy, but not necessarily untenable. <br />nirtiachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17385715385141580690noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-20963512371564239502016-04-02T11:45:04.186-07:002016-04-02T11:45:04.186-07:00“We suggest that this is how the proposition was b...“We suggest that this is how the proposition was born. Learners may have begun picking up new composite categories through passive observational learning. But once the knower—motivated to help kin or collaborators learn by sharing categories—became actively involved in the communication of the composite categories, it became intentional rather than incidental instruction, with the teacher actively miming the new category descriptions to the learner. The category “names” would also become shorter and faster— less iconic and more arbitrary—once their propositional intent (the “propositional attitude”) was being construed and adopted mutually by both the teacher and the learner.”<br /><br />I’m confused about the process of teachers teaching new category descriptions via miming their descriptions to learners. The authors write in section 4.3 “It could be that our ancestors had the power of communication by pantomime before the advent of language; but you can’t convey new categories by pantomime alone. All you can do is mime objects, events, and actions, and to a certain extent, properties and states (including requests and threats).” If you can communicate objects, events, etc. through pantomime why can these not constitute explanations of new categories that can be passed from teacher to learner without language? If category names, once they become arbitrary, are represented by their “shape” alone and thus their sensory modality no longer matters, why can this “shape” not be expressed through pantomime as a form of symbol grounding (vs language)? I understand the advantages/adaptive value of being able to use your hands to do something while communicating rather than relying on gestures (and not being able to use your hands for anything else at the same time). I don’t understand how new categories cannot be communicated by pantomime alone; for example, does sign language not do exactly that? <br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07528898581889060359noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-18172339726723303242016-03-31T20:05:55.472-07:002016-03-31T20:05:55.472-07:00“Many of these cognitive components (and probably ...“Many of these cognitive components (and probably other ones too) were already available before language began (though some of them may also be effects rather than causes of language). It could well be that our ancestors had the power of communication by pantomime before the advent of language; but you can’t convey new categories by pantomime alone.”<br /><br />This quote confused me in terms of whether or not it is really an argument for natural selection, or an argument for language as a bi-product of some other mechanism. It seems like stating that the cognitive components for language already existed prior to the existence of language itself suggests that there is some process or mechanism of discovery (possibly the other mechanism that is being referred to by Chomsky when refuting the possibility of natural selection in language creation, or based on non-adaptionist mechanisms from neo-Darwinian evolutionist theory) that is occurring by-which language is produced. While I was convinced otherwise with the 8a. reading, this reading leaves me confused over whether the process of language production being defined and labelled as natural selection is simply a discovery process for a more effective or different use of an existing complex system. Similar to in the example of wings being created for flying and then used as a shading mechanism, there would still have to be some mechanism of discovery by which this change of function is determined and selected for. <br /><br />We use the idea of ‘natural selection’ and ‘adaptation’ exclusively to describe a selection that is against the odds in terms of increasing in complexity, but with the odds in terms of increasing chances of survival. This makes sense, and it makes sense that we think of a change differently when the odds of its occurrence are statistically favourable to both be discovered and be repeated (thus arise the non-adaptionist mechanisms of change). It seems that the argument in this paper, largely based on the ease with which something so complex could come about in our species since there were so many pre-existing structures that could be used, as well as an existing high level of intelligence, is arguing that language came about by the fact that its existence was statistically favourable, as was the odds of its creation given the existing structures. Perhaps this argument, while proving language is something whose creation was adaptive, is better suited as evidence for the Neo-Darwinian theory of evolution, showing that non-adaptionist mechanisms are far more relevant than we initially believed. <br /><br />It seems like this paper has also divided the evolution of language and language structures into a different time frame so as to argue for its natural selection. Stating that the existence of complex structures is what allowed for its natural selection is maybe providing evidence for a new understanding of natural selectionist and evolutionary theory altogether. Depending on the time frame that is denoted, one can say that language is a bi-product in the evolutionary process selecting for the existence of intelligence and other neural mechanisms that language relies on, or, one can say (like in this article), that language was specifically selected for in light of the existence of these complex neurological mechanisms. It seems that “natural selection” may in fact be more of a combination between non-adaptationist and adaptationist approaches than we previously considered, allowing us to bypass the idea that there always has to be some intermediate state. <br />Ironically, the argument that ‘language is so unbelievable complex that it cannot be a product of evolutionary theory of natural selection at all’ that is seen in the rhetoric of Chomsky and others doesn’t seem to fit anywhere when mapping the possibilities of its origin. It seems that no matter how complex a mechanism, with a strong enough adaptive potential (which clearly exists), it can be created. The complexity of language further attests to the adaptive advantages that clearly resulted from its use. <br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12241787115594437509noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-69462510173650593672016-03-30T14:19:35.974-07:002016-03-30T14:19:35.974-07:00Is this article saying that gestural – or pantomim...Is this article saying that gestural – or pantomime – communication was truly the forbearer for all other forms of communication? I mean, I think the idea is to show the evolutionary progression of language from “grunting” to Virginia Woolf. I think the paper is very successful in showing the how and why of propositions, as well as producing empirical data in support of the advantage of instruction over induction. I would definitely say that Stevan’s “show to tell” concept is worth being investigated further, especially the advantage of instruction (given that Stevan at least proved it can be studied). <br /><br />I would like propose that Stevan’s concept of the “pantomime” as the essential start of language might be incomplete. I think that pointing and uttering sounds is not the only way to communicate non-verbally. I’m talking about cave-drawings. First of all, does Stevan think that drawing can only come after the development of language? I think that would be unlikely. Drawing, just like grunting and pointing, is meaningful and non-arbitrary. What’s remarkable about cave-drawing is that we can look at examples that have been kept nice through history, and pull something out of it. These people were drawing things, and those things resemble kinds of things in the world. I don’t think it’s a stretch to say that someone could learn instructively from pictures. If someone already possesses inductive knowledge of concepts represented in the picture (for instance, a mammoth, a person, and blood), the drawing could possibly convey new categories to the learner (mammoth belongs to category of dangerous). It is that syntactical structure for uttered sounds makes instruction possible, or merely that some induced categories have already been learned in whatever way? <br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13002631969647958913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-28836463191370198932016-03-28T19:11:59.562-07:002016-03-28T19:11:59.562-07:00Protolanguage:
This part of the paper got me slig...Protolanguage:<br /><br />This part of the paper got me slightly confused. I did not quite understand this concept of a protolanguage. What is a protolanguage? It seems like the homunculus argument all over again for me. If a protolanguage can express everything you need it to, then shouldn’t it be considered as a language (and not a protolanguage)?<br /><br />—— <br /><br />Combining and communicating categories:<br /><br />The question “Was the power of language invented or discovered?” got my attention. This got me thinking, did categories come first or did language. Did we create language because we started categorizing things or did we start categorizing things because we could express them through language?<br /><br />——<br /><br />Repose to Oliver H:<br /><br />“I’m confused as to how explaining the origin of language as conventionalized communication explains how UG is inborn, since the kernel is learned”<br /><br />By conventionalized communication are you implying that there could have been other ways to communicate other than language? I may be misinterpreting your point.<br /><br />The fact that UG is an inborn framework helps us to develop our communication/linguistic skills. When we talk about language conventions, we get different language but all languages have so many common aspects to them (which we could term as UG). Additionally, the kernel is learned and what is used by the UG framework for us to get ‘language’.Nivit Kochharhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02862823112183046960noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-27147364574943456232016-03-27T19:52:37.503-07:002016-03-27T19:52:37.503-07:00So, if I understand the claim of the paper, the ma...So, if I understand the claim of the paper, the main difference between an ape’s ability to sign categories — and even combine words into novel categories, like pizza = bread tomato cheese — and our fully developed propositional speech is our drive to do it more? <br />This makes some sense to me, but fundamentally I find it difficult to bridge the behavioral gap between naming compound objects and predicating. And to claim that one is merely repetition of the other with increasing complexity… I’m not sure. <br />But then again, it is helpful to remind myself that languages without the ‘is’ predicate, wherein “apple red” is a grammatical proposition, show great resemblance to the compound objects of the “bread tomato cheese” variety. Perhaps it did just come down to our compulsive obsession with naming things that eventually generated our speech. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12753114099188487403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-61459440979821921282016-03-27T18:03:29.624-07:002016-03-27T18:03:29.624-07:00To put a finer point on my questions, the part I’m...To put a finer point on my questions, the part I’m actually having trouble understanding is this:<br /><br />“when we manipulate natural language symbols (in other words, words) in order to say all the things we mean to say, our symbol manipulations are governed by a further constraint, over and above the syntax that determines whether or not they are well-formed: that further constraint is the “shape” of the words’ meanings.”<br /><br />If we tie propositional logic variables (of which we have an infinite amount: A, A’, A’’ and so on), to meaningful and grounded natural language, does this cause the formal language to become a natural one?<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15484890696945967505noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-91329558425151591672016-03-27T17:34:40.141-07:002016-03-27T17:34:40.141-07:00“Those artificial languages do have formal definit...“Those artificial languages do have formal definitions, but we suggest that in reality all of them are merely parts or subsets of natural language. “<br /><br />You mentioned this in class as well and at the time it seemed intuitive to me. But now that I think about it a little more I realize I have trouble coming up with an explanation of why this is the case. My understanding is that the reason is because an artificial language like mathematics or C++ cannot make “any and every proposition,” but natural languages can. And furthermore, that because natural languages can make any and ever proposition, it follows that they can make all of the propositions that can be made by an artificial language, rendering that artificial language a subset of the natural one.<br /><br />Where I get stuck, though, is thinking about propositional logic. With all of the operands (∧,∨, &, || etc.), isn’t it the case that we can make any and all propositions? If not, what would an example be of a proposition it could not make? If so, does propositional logic constitute an artificial or natural language (or perhaps neither)? Because it seems as though any natural language proposition could simply be captured by, say, “A” where A represented "the cat is on the mat," "the Pinker paper was long," or any other conceivable proposition. <br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15484890696945967505noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-36611272940988212872016-03-18T10:30:25.380-07:002016-03-18T10:30:25.380-07:00Hi Alba,
Nice quote! I also have always thought t...Hi Alba, <br />Nice quote! I also have always thought that language and motivation go hand in hand. For example, when someone learns a second language a lot of motivation is needed. Learning a language takes a lot of effort, time and dedication. That could not be down without motivation. AND learning a second language can open many doors to different jobs/new friends etc., which in itself is motivating.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09866263141415754271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-75425294083851359052016-03-18T10:09:15.672-07:002016-03-18T10:09:15.672-07:00Hi Adrienne,
I too am a fan of Koko and have wat...Hi Adrienne, <br /><br />I too am a fan of Koko and have watched my fair share of videos of her. For a while, I thought that Koko was just undergoing the Clever Hans Effect, which Julia brought up in the 8a skywriting. However, after seeing Koko respond to appropriately to sad news (Robin Williams’s death, and Koko’s kitten’s death), creating words (Koko was never taught the sign for ‘ring’, but combined the signs for ‘finger’ and ‘bracelet’) and signing about language signing, made me hope/believe as well as you, that she might be understanding propositions but is just lacking the motive for language.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09866263141415754271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-70932438607293389372016-03-15T13:08:45.165-07:002016-03-15T13:08:45.165-07:00‘’Baldwinian evolution began to favor this disposi...‘’Baldwinian evolution began to favor this disposition to learn and to use symbols to name categories and then to recombine their names in order to predicate and propositionalize about further categories, because of the adaptive benefits that category description and sharing conferred’’<br /><br />In the history of language evolution, I wonder whether the fact that our hands, facial muscles and vocal systems are so much more adapted to encompassing a complex language system was the reason that we were able to first develop language, or whether we developed these systems as the adaptive advantage of intricate communication began to show through the passing down of genes.<br /><br />Humans have a much more agile vocal system than many animals, and a fine tuned auditory perceptual system. When did these appear? Before language or due to the evolution of language?<br /><br />If categorical description and sharing these descriptions was the initial aim of language, then how did language developed into such a rich and complex system? Surely for evolutionary advantage, simplicity would be best? Why bother to evolve a Universal Grammar? When and why did language stop being merely an adaptive system and become such an important cultural tool and such a nuanced mechanism of communication? If language is such an advantage, why haven’t other species also evolved to have a similar system?<br />Rose Whttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01573094216549499415noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-49393367174865618832016-03-15T12:33:10.822-07:002016-03-15T12:33:10.822-07:00On the discussion of chimps:
On the topic of whe...On the discussion of chimps: <br /><br />On the topic of whether chimps learn language, Harnad argues that they never really learn language: they have categories, and we train them to name these categories. Moreover, they never progress from this learned categorization to making new categories. <br /><br />Harnad is right in that "we are really not sure whether chimps really do get it." They may or may not understand that when they are taught to communicate "banana," they understand the truth value. But, how important is the power of proposition when determining whether chimps learn language? For example, honeybees have a waggle dance to communicate information about patches of flower for nectar and pollen. Obviously, the waggle dance is not a language, with symbols and grammar, but the action in itself is a proposition. So if proposition and language can be mutually exclusive, can it be a determining factor in whether chimps really do get it or not? <br /><br />Harnad also suggests that the reason that chimps do not go on to name and describe new things is that they lack the motivation to do so. This to me is very unsatisfying and does not seem to answer the question. <br /><br />A question that I had from in class discussion and this paper is how neural nets are determined. <br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10743399288997254112noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-62736972405579534122016-03-14T18:41:06.457-07:002016-03-14T18:41:06.457-07:00"We are not sure whether chimps really do get..."We are not sure whether chimps really do get it. They get the associations and the contingencies; but do they get them as propositions, with truth values? It’s It is hard to say. What’s most puzzling is why they don’t seem to pick up on the power that is within their hands when they start systematically combining symbols to define new categories. What seems missing is not the intelligence but the motivation, indeed the compulsion, to name and describe."<br /><br />In the discussion on evolution it was mentioned that traits can coexist in multiple species because of shared ancestry and because of general adaptiveness of the trait which makes evolution select for it in several further away species! It seems curious that this has not been the case for something as adaptive as language and as such i find the discussion on the 'disposition to propose' particularly interesting Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11134473205623428266noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-8869658824895497572016-03-14T17:20:59.921-07:002016-03-14T17:20:59.921-07:00This paper touches on the phenomenon which is lang...This paper touches on the phenomenon which is language and its possible origins. It begins by explaining the relationship between show and tell, which is that before linguistic ability “existed”, the only way to learn and acquire categories was through actions, showing in a way to give feedback to the learner. Somewhere along the way an ability to verbally transmit this information emerged. Then, an attempt is made to explain what language is. It emerged that language itself it not that important to study, as it is a product of UG - Universal Grammar, an innate ability to acquire language without need for feedback. Therefore rather than studying the origin of UG, it might be more interesting to study the origin of UG. Ug is quite a powerful tool: it gives the ability to generate any possible and imaginable well formed sentence with a truth value (although the actually truth value is of little importance). A protolanguage is a system used to test whether or not it is truly possible to express anything in a given language. A symbol is an arbitrary shape/object used to refer to an object. This means that the shape of the symbol does not actually point to what its referent actually is. Categories are kinds of objects. Categorization is doing the right thing with the right kind of thing. This leads to the symbol grounding problem: how to know what to do with the symbols referring to an object? And how to ground the symbol by linking it to its meaning? Simulation of the origin of language was attempted, however it is still unclear as to know it emerged in the first place (because even in the simulation there were preexisting entities able to “voice”). Language is powerful in that it is able to teach and acquire categories, but it can also combine them into bigger categories and communicate those to other thinking organisms.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07258603697722601029noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-58740032352555209772016-03-13T22:33:35.585-07:002016-03-13T22:33:35.585-07:00Hi, I would like to address a few of the things yo...Hi, I would like to address a few of the things you have said here (but not all of them). <br /><br />Firstly, 'how are we sure that only human beings can learn categories by word of mouth “instruction”? It seems like a lot of the evidence in previous articles stems from research done on animals, why hasn’t this article considered doing such? Although it is evident that animals don’t speak the same language as humans, perhaps with their own language they are able to learn by instruction as well.' <br />I'm not quite sure where this is coming from, but animal don't have language. Humans are the only organisms who have language. Almost every organism on the planet has communication and many of them have vocal communication. But that is not language and that does not allow them to confer verbal instruction. The closest thing an animal might have to verbal instruction would be mimicry, but of course this is quite different. <br /><br />Secondly, 'the article mentions that universal grammar is inborn. I am having trouble grasping this concept. Firstly, it seems like this could be an argument of nature vs. nurture. There are many cases, such as the famous one with genie, who was lacking any form of language and grammar, and this could have been due to her being held captive and deprived of her learning abilities.' Universal grammar is inborn. Language is not. There is no argument of nature vs. nurture because Universal grammar is 'nature.' They have done experiment with week-old babies and it has been shown that these babies are able to distinguish between different languages. This ability goes away after the baby matures to a certain age. So all babies are born with the ability to acquire any language. And if the baby is not exposed to language, the baby will not acquire language, this is certain. So what you are saying about the reason Genie had no grammar or language was due to the fact that she was held captive and away from exposure to language is entirely correct. But this has nothing to do with putting the inborn nature of Universal Grammar into question. Genie was born with innate Universal Grammar but was unable to implement it since she was not exposed to language. <br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05119485457325429564noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-73981914858245685912016-03-13T22:02:10.862-07:002016-03-13T22:02:10.862-07:00“When we put the induction-only learners in compet...“When we put the induction-only learners in competition with the instruction learners, within a few generations the instruction learners had out-survived and out reproduced the induction learners, of which there were no longer any survivors left.”<br /> <br />The instruction learners were able to learn from others as well as from their categories, they could watch others and ‘steal’ the categories and understanding. Observation and imitation are key to quick learning and survival as the paper points out, communication enhances this ability as well as creates the possibility of teaching kin to also keep them alive. Mirror neurons can be shown in this example to be important. With only non-verbal communication was at play it is easy to imagine the necessity for motor neurons was ten fold. Without the ability to explicitly say what action you are carrying out, motor neurons would have provided the recognition of understanding when they purposely only eat mushroom C and avoid mushroom A. <br /><br />“Despite its dramatic benefits, however, learning categories through language, by symbolic instruction, is not completely equivalent to learning them by sensorimotor induction.” <br /><br />I feel like this is a really important point. Although, as pointed out in the former quote, symbolic instruction may have had more survivors and more offspring, that cannot take away from the value of sensorimotor induction. Without it in the first place no learning could take place. The referent would be lost and understanding would have no ground to stand on.<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02553057605599039651noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-65632575780010399222016-03-13T19:52:33.630-07:002016-03-13T19:52:33.630-07:00“For those readers who have doubts, and think ther...<br />“For those readers who have doubts, and think there is something one can say…. You will find you have generated your own counterexample (4).” <br /><br />I loved this quote. <br /><br />Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this paper made some of my confusion about what computation is (From way back in 1.A) make a lot more sense, because symbols are arbitrary it is just the things we attribute to them that matter (like truth to the statement 2+2=4).<br />This is the autonomy of syntax it seems, the rules that decide how we can manipulate symbols are independent and formal – they don't have anything to do with the meaning of the symbols. They are interpretable because of how we have learned to use symbols. This is pretty amazing and makes me take more stock in universal grammar as a theory – at least for things that are not natural languages like coding languages and arithmetic, because there are so many combinations of ways you can put things together and it seems like often times learning a rule isn’t enough to account for the amount of knowledge and recombination we can do. <br /><br />In terms of categorization this is really interesting – it makes me wonder if the universal grammar system is not more just a universal categorization system built on instruction (maybe this is what the abstract was saying but I am not totally sure). Since most of the words in our natural languages are content/category words, it seems like there is an innate UG/C (universal grammar with specialization for categories). The categories themselves are not inborn but the capacity for them might be….<br />(<i> quick aside, aren’t there some categories that are inherent? Like smiles and frowns or tastes of bitter versus sweet things? Does this have any bearing on evolution of language – things like the moral emotions that are cross-cultural? Or is this just an example of the weak Whorf hypothesis? </i>?)<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06491129302179620885noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-45005042402114684132016-03-13T19:49:24.242-07:002016-03-13T19:49:24.242-07:00Also, I finally think this is a fantastic explanat...Also, I finally think this is a fantastic explanation of the way that our human brains became biased towards language "The tendency to acquire and convey categories by instruction thus grew stronger and stronger in the genomes and brains of the offspring of those who were more motivated and disposed to learn to do so. And that became our species’ “language-biased” brain." I've always felt that there is a big part of language that involves motivation and the idea that the primate ancestors may have had the capacity but not the motivation completely makes sense to me. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03541247890693616412noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-38322655368131296622016-03-13T19:46:41.033-07:002016-03-13T19:46:41.033-07:00"That advantage must have been enormous, to h..."That advantage must have been enormous, to have become encoded in our genotypes and encephalized in our language-prepared brains as it did." <br /><br />First of all, I really appreciated this sentence off the bat because it spoke to my distaste for the last article in that it included the phrase "encephalized in our language-prepared brains" which is a much better picture of language development already. This obviously goes on to mean UG but I just really was happy with that phrase. <br /><br />I'm a bit confused how chimps having categories "Chimps have categories. We keep training them to “name” their categories (whether with gestures, symbolic objects, computer keyboards, or words) — even to combine those names into quasi-propositional strings. " but this contradicts what was said that pantomime alone cannot convey new categories. Wouldn't chimps need pantomime "gestures" to convey the categories they have? Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03541247890693616412noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8019050899542469366.post-83578601850632530442016-03-12T18:20:14.798-08:002016-03-12T18:20:14.798-08:00Timothy, the sample dictionary was not a real dict...Timothy, the sample dictionary was not a real dictionary. It was just a toy example to illustrate what a dictionary graph looks like and how you can reduce it to the Kernel, the Satellites, Core and MinSets. The definitions are not real, and hence neither are the words. (But you're right that function words should have been excluded from the example! We've made better ones since -- in fact real toy dictionaries from the dictionary game (try it -- but if you start a dictionary, finish it too!): <a href="http://lexis.uqam.ca:8080/dictGame/" rel="nofollow">http://lexis.uqam.ca:8080/dictGame/</a>Instructorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08246824164400922565noreply@blogger.com